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The Alas~an State Timber Sales Case: Can the State Require
Local Przmary Manufacture?
by Robert H. Abrams
South-Central Timber Development, Inc.
v.
LeResche, et. al.
(Docket No. 82-1608)
To be argued February 29, 1984
ISSUES
Throughout United States history, the states have
enacted legislation benefiting local economic activities in
preference to competing activities in other states and
abroad. In both theory and purpose, the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution limits parochial, protectionist
state laws of this type - although the extent of this
constitutional check on state power has never been pre-
cisely defined. In recent years, the Supreme Court has
heard a number of cases involving Commerce Clause
challenges to state laws that erect various types of in-
state preferences in regard to exploitation of the natural
resources found within the state. The topics of these
cases in the last decade have been varied - ranging
from minnow seining (Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 434
(1979» to landfill space (City ofPhiladelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. (1978» to groundwater (Sporhase v. Nebraska,
102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982» to Portland cement (Reeves v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980». This case, involving timber
cut on state-owned lands in Alaska, is yet another chap-
ter in this ongoing line of cases.
The specific state practice questioned here is requir-
ing that bidders for the purchase of Alaska's timber
stands perform primary manufacturing operations
within that state rather than export the logs for pro-
cessing elsewhere. The major issue in this case is quite
plain: Does the Alaskan primary manufacture require-
ment offend the Commerce Clause?
FACTS
In 1980, the state of Alaska issued a notice of sale of
49 million board feet of standing timber from state-
owned lands in the area of Icy Cape, Alaska. The notice
of sale, the prospectus and the proposed contract all
imposed a primary manufacture requirement - the
timber would have to be processed in-state prior to
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being exported into either interstate or international
commerce.
(A small glossary is helpful. "Timber" means trees in
their natural condition and location, live or dead from
natural causes; "logs" means portions of trees cut into
lengths with the limbs removed, transported off the land
where they grew and ready for manufacture; "cants" are
portions of logs which have been cut lengthwise and are
thus flat on at least one side, but which will have to be cut
lengthwise at least once again to produce "lumber" suita-
ble for end use.)
Specifically, the primary manufacture requirement
for the Icy Cape sale forbade log export while permit-
ting export of either cants or lumber. The undisputed
reason for inserting the primary manufacture stricture
was to provide for local employment in the processing
industry and to produce building materials for the
Alaskan market.
The petitioner in this case, South-Central Timber
Development, was in the business of harvesting timber
in the Icy Cape area - primarily for export to Japan.
Indeed, South-Central was operating on state-owned
lands under a previous sale that did not include a pri-
mary manufacture requirement. At the time of the sec-
ond Icy Cape sale, South-Central did not have a working
mill in the area and would have had to contract out the
local processing required by the state. South-Central
claimed that contracting for in-state processing was
"uneconomical" and that it was therefore precluded
from bidding on the timber. One week before the sched-
uled sale, South-Central, alleging that it would suffer
irreparable injury if the sale were held as scheduled
initiated litigation in the federal district court. It sought
to enjoin the upcoming sale on the ground that the
primary manufacture provision violated the Commerce
Clause.
The United States District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of South-Central and on January 6,
1981, enjoined Alaska from enforcing the primary
manufacture requirement. The case was appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the
district court and sustained the constitutionality of the
primary manufacture requirement. Interestingly, when
the litigated Icy Cape sale was ultimatelv conducted in
November of 1983, Alaska had dropped the primary
manufacture requirement. While all parties to the case
argue that the case is not now moot, the Supreme Court
could opt to dismiss the writ of certiorari for that reason.
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Among the states, Alaska is extraordinarily rich in
natural resources such as timber, oil and mineral depos-
its that are found on state-owned lands. This reflects not
only the fact that these resources are abundantly present
physically, but also that Alaska, unlike virtually all of the
other states, is owner of vast tracts of land within its
borders. At the time of statehood and thereafter, Con-
gress provided Alaska with the large landholdings, at
least in part, to permit the state to generate revenues to
help finance state-provided services to its residents and
to foster development of the local economy. In a parallel
vein, federal management of federal lands in Alaska has
frequently sought to encourage development of the
Alaskan economy. In consequence of its natural re-
source wealth and in harmony with these longstanding
general federal policies, Alaska, through the sale and
primary manufacture requirement, sought to garner
both state revenue from the sale and the benefits of
milling activities in Alaska - that is, jobs and lumber
supply.
As noted in the "Issues" section, local preference
laws in the natural resources field are of lively constitu-
tional concern. The form of the preference in this case,
a primary manufacture requ-irement, is one that has
several times before been litigated in the Supreme
Court. This preference form is usually invalidated by
the Court because it "Balkanizes" the nation in contra-
vention of the oft-cited Commerce Clause adage that
"our economic unit is the nation."
Counterpoised to this line of cases, however, is the
recently enunciated doctrine that when a state acts as a
market participant (instead of as regulator), it is free to
act in many of the same ways as would private partici-
pants in the market. Two such behaviors include selec-
tively refusing to deal with another party and
conditioning contracts on the agreement to abide by
fixed contractual terms. Specifically, the Supreme Court
on this theory has found that state (or local) govern-
ments can grant priority to in-state purchasers of state-
produced cement in time of regional cement shortage
and insist that contractors awarded contracts to perform
work for the government employ a specified percentage
of local residents. The Alaskan timber case stands
squarely in the intersection of these opposed lines of
cases. As such, whatever the decision of the Court, if the
decision addresses the conflict between protectionism
and market participation, the case will be of doctrinal
significance.
Other factors in the case may allow the Supreme
Court to dispose of it in a way that avoids these issues. As
noted above, the ultimate sale of timber was made with-
out a primary manufacture requirement. This could
result in a mootness dismissal, despite the parties' claims
that a live controversy remains among them. Second, it
is generally conceded that Congress' plenary power
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under the Commerce Clause allows authorizing states to
act in ways that would otherwise run afoul of the anti-
Balkanization principle enforced by the Supreme
Court's case-by-case determinations. In this case, the
unique history of Alaska and the behavior of Congress
regarding Alaskan natural resources offers the possi-
bility that the Court could decide that Congress has
ratified the local preference involved in this case.
ARGUMENTS
For South-Central Timber Development, Inc.
1. The primary manufacture requirement does not
evenhandedly regulate in-state and out-of-state
timber processors and is therefore a violation of the
Commerce Clause.
2. The primary manufacture requirement directly bur-
dens interstate commerce and therefore violates the
Commerce Clause.
3. Congress has not expressly or impliedly consented to
Alaska's primary manufacture requirement.
4. The market participant doctrine does not apply to
this case because the timber market is not one that the
state has created.
5. The market participant doctrine does not apply to
this case because it involves competition for raw
materials rather than refined products.
For the state ofAlaska and Kenai Lumber Co., Inc.
1. Congress has endorsed Alaska's primary manufac-
ture requirement and removed it from Commerce
Clause scrutiny.
2. The Commerce Clause does not limit a state in choos-
ing the terms on which it will enter into contracts.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
For the United States in Support ofSouth-Central Timber
1. Congressional consent to the primary manufacture
requirement cannot be inferred from "parallel" fed-
eral timber policies in Alaska.
2. The primary manufacture requirement impermis-
sibly burdens interstate commerce.
3. Alaska's primary manufacture requirement is not
within the market participant doctrine.
For Pacific Rim Trade Association and Washington
Citizens for World Trade in Support ofSouth-Central
1. The large export trade from the Pacific Northwest to
the Orient is important to the region's economy.
2. Douglas fir and hemlock-spruce logs are a valuable
e~port commodity - the trade in which is jeopar-
dized by log export restrictions that protect local pro-
cessors.
3. Restrictions on export of logs cut on state-owned
lands will be increasingly economically significant in
the future.
PREVIEW
For Northwest Independent Forest Manufacturers, North-
west Timber Association and International Woodworkers
ofAmerica in Support ofAlaska
1. The primary manufacture requirement has a minor
effect on interstate and foreign commerce.
ARGUMENTS: FEBRUARY SESSION
2. Invalidating the primary manufacture requirement
would have a substantial effect on the local public
interest.
Tuesday, February 21
1. Hayfield Northern RR Co., Inc. v. Chi-
cago & North Western Transportation
Co. (82-1579) (Preview 321-323)
2. Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Rob-
bins (82-1860)
Prosser's Moving & Storage Co. v. Rob-
bins (82-1862)
3. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart (82-1721)
(Preview 317 -319)
4. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp (82-
1795)
Wednesday, February 22
5. Tower v. Glover (82-1988)
6. Palmore v. Sidoti (82-1734)
7. Limbach v, The Hooven & Allison Co.
(83-96)
8. Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United
States (82-1994)
NOTE: Monday, February 20, is a holiday.
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Monday, February 27
1. Heckler v. Community Health Services
of Crawford County, Inc. (83-56)
2. Heckler v. Ringer (82-1772)
3. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich.
(83-219)
4. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. (83-196)
Tuesday, February 28
5. Board of Education of Paris Union
School Dist. No. 95 v. Vail (83-87)
6. Koehler v. Engle (83-1)
7. James v. Kentucky (82-6840) (PrevIew
315-316)
8. Patton v. Yount (83-95)
Wednesday, February 29
9. Allen v. Wright (82-757)
Regan v. Wright (81-970)
10. Summa Corp. v. California Ex ReI.
State Lands Commission (82-708)
11. South-Central Timber Development,
Inc. v. LeResche (82-1608) (Preview
325-327)
12. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. (82-
1005)
American Iron & Steel Institute Y. Na-
tural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(82-1247)
Ruckelshaus Y. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. (82-1591)
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SUBJECT INDEX OF CASES
(continued)
Utilities
Aluminum Company of America, et al. v.
Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District, et
al. (82-1071) (Preview 235-236)
Norfolk Redevelopment Authority v. Ches-
apeake and Potomac Telephone (81-2332)
(Preview 143-145)
Water Rights
Colorado v. New Mexico (80 Orig.) (Preview
237-239)
Louisiana v. Mississippi (86 Orig.) (Preview
271-272)
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